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Irony is a healthiness 
insofar as it rescues the soul from the snares of relativity; it is a sickness insofar as it cannot 
bear the absolute except in the form of nothing, but this sickness is an endemic disease that 
only a few individuals catch and from which fewer recover. 
      
 
 
 The Socratic truth is in no way inferior to the Christian one 
according to Kierkegaard, since the very existence of Socrates is irony, as an 
Aufhebung of the two Socrates built by Platon and Xenofon: Each of these 
two interpretations has, of course, sought to give a complete 
characterization of Socrates—Xenophon by pulling him down into the lower 
regions of the useful, Plato by elevating him into the supramundane regions 
of the idea. But the point, one that lies between, invisible and so very difficult 
to grasp securely, is irony. […] Irony oscillates between the ideal I and the 
empirical I; the one would make Socrates a philosopher, the other a Sophist; 
but what makes him more than a Sophist is that his empirical I has universal 
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validity.1 Putting aside the (r)evolution in Kierkegaard’s view from the 
Hegelian perspective of the master’s thesis to the later dimensions of irony, 
which becomes the very mechanism of his own incognito writing, we can 
affirm that the fundamental difference between the two truths is the fact 
that the former can’t be given as such, is not circulated by means of a 
donation. Therefore, irony always pertains to a melancholic approach of 
existence because it denies all functional (effective) outwardness 
(exteriority) of the relation with the Other, whilst it also displaces the 
symptom of the melancholic void through a self-referential rhetoric that is 
structured around the sense of silence, more precisely, on silence as a half 
sense – (half-saying, mi-dire in Lacanian Psychoanalysis, according to which 
we can never consciously say the truth but only by half saying say it). 
That’s why the stake of irony ultimately reaches an original opening, what 
Freud used to call Bejahung, even more than the parapraxis (a slip in the 
speech or discourse which bears the mark of the Unconscious inherent to 
the articulated language and to the discontinuity of dis-course as such). But 
irony is everywhere throughout Kierkegaard’s oeuvre, without being 
conceptualized, but simply at work within the text itself – we could even 
name it a white demonic, in relative contrast to the gloomy seriousness of 
the paternal melancholy, but no less radical than it; a certain obscure note 
from the Journal, suggestively entitled About myself, can be interpreted as 
such a distinction between demonic and irony with respect to silence: 
Silence hid in silence is suspicious, arouses mistrust, it is just as though one 
were to betray something; at least betrayed that one was keeping silence. But 
silence concealed by a decided talent for conversation – as true as ever I live 
– that is silence.2 We can observe the aforementioned insidious irony 
within the text in Kierkegaard’s comparison with the truth of life, that 
suggests the ambiguity between an authentic vitality (as opposed to the 
romantic one) and the heaviness of life (heavy-mindedness – Tungsind, the 
key term for melancholy) hidden in the lightness of the heuristic talent – a 
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pp. 127-128. 
2 Journals, p. 245. 
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tension that will become acute in Kierkegaard’s final years, when all his 
masks will have fallen. 
 Coming back to Socrates, we must mention first of all that his 
silence concentrates a melancholic resistance to language through, 
paraphrasing Sylviane Agacinski, the battle whose means and end is 
silence, at work like a phenomenological epoché with the fundamental 
commitment not to betray the truth: The ironist talks at least this one did 
not write but he is not for all that a voice; he carries on a battle in which 
silence is both the means and the end of the combat. Even when he talks, the 
ironist does not say anything; he effaces himself in the questioning and allows 
the answers to become manifest in their apparent positivity. He is pure 
solicitation, provocation, although he himself remains hidden. And when at 
last all the answers have canceled themselves out, the ironist imposes silence 
on his distraught and befuddled interlocutors.3 Hence the double negativity, 
existential and conceptual, of Socrates, and also the fundamental indication 
of maieutics, which is not one of constraint, but of offering the occasion to 
experience the truth. According to Jeanne Hersch, Kierkegaard opposes the 
God (Christ), the condition of the truth, to Socrates, who stands for its 
occasion. The master is in this view only the occasion and that’s precisely 
why he must not give himself over. The magnanimity and nobility that 
Kierkegaard bestows upon Socrates consists in his self effacement, in his 
disappearance in front of the eternal truth, whose discovery he had 
occasioned for the student.4 Irony has nevertheless a demonic side, 
acknowledged as such by Kierkegaard, consequently, the peril of 
mortification is always present and, on the other hand, Socrates immerges 
the truth into the tragic, without being himself neither a tragic hero, nor a 
knight of faith, because once the receptive disposition for the truth has 
been formed, he simply disappears, cancelling any dialectics that could 
lead to a certain positivity by undermining both the negation itself and him 
as existence. (That’s why, as we’ve mentioned in the beginning, 
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Kierkegaard states that his existence is irony.) This anti-dialectics 
resembles what Lacanian Psychoanalysis understands by situating oneself 
in the lack of the Other’s desire, not an imaginary blank, but a real one, 
insofar as for Lacan the real means the impossible par excellence. In 
Kierkegaard’s Socratic dimension, we can develop these psychoanalytical 
insights even further, as long as we know that the melancholic identifies 
itself with this lack, which for him becomes indeed a real lack of lack 
(manque du manque) because the first lack has not been fully symbolized 
at the time of his castration, his entering into language. Moreover, just like 
the objet a cause du désir, the concept of Socrates is constituted as lost in 
the aftermath of his self-annihilation – given the fact that, as Kierkegaard 
puts it, he is already dead. That’s why the melancholic identification with 
the nothing that overcomes all subjective identity can be traced throughout 
the Socratic irony, in contrast with the philosophical modern identity, an 
obsessional and always assertive one. It’s the nature of remedy that 
Socrates can bring about in an age of the light-mindedness, that 
foreshadows the heavy-mindedness of melancholy, that of modernity 
which includes romanticism and Hegel, metaphysics and official 
Protestantism. That’s why Socrates can only be an occasion for the truth, as 
it implies a double movement away from it: the first negation and then an 
anamnesis of the negation, because the master has to remind the disciple 
that he is the un-truth (which the disciple up discovering himself). As a 
place and origin of the tragic through the comic, irony, constitutive in 
Socrates’ life, points to a melancholic negativity that institutes at the limit 
of language the heaviness of its disappearance – Kierkegaard’s reference to 
the perspective(s) of Aristofan is eloquent in this respect: This earnestness 
bears down too heavily, just as it also restricts the comic infinity, which as 
such recognizes no limits. Irony, on the other hand, is simultaneously a new 
position and as such is absolutely polemical toward early Greek culture. It is 
a position that continually cancels itself; it is a nothing that devours 
everything, and a something one can never grab hold of, something that is 
and is [XIII 217] not at the same time, but something that at rock bottom is 
comic. Therefore, just as irony surmounts everything by seeing its misrelation 
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to the idea, so it capitulates to itself, because it continually goes over and 
beyond itself and yet remains in the idea.5 
 The affirmation of negation as an inexhaustible and abysmal return 
(foreshadowing the ineffable theme of the authentic repetition), without 
mortifying the idea in the faustian demonical manner of a totalitarian 
representation, indicates an original version of the melancholic self-
negation. The comic intertwined with the isolation and with the self 
absorption indicates an irresistible plunge into nothingness which, like the 
Heideggerian Verfallen, pertains to a dialectics of authenticity, but not in 
favor of the indetermination of Being, for the absolute for him is nothing, for 
irony continually goes over and behind itself. The exception is thus double: 
toward the maniac triumph of the sophists and towards the obsessional 
desire of Socrates’ disciples, and, therefore, a non-philosophical 
articulation of the ironist as a prophecy about or an abbreviation of a 
complete personality. We think that this abbreviation can only manifest 
itself with and within the denial of the denial of language (the 
abovementioned double negation without Hegelian sublation). We can 
retrace the Lacanian half saying in this abbreviation for which Socrates 
stands because his status perpetually indicates the rest of the a mythical 
jouissance through a melancholic existence, even more so as the 
personality is annihilated at the end of the dialectics, the idea of Socrates 
collapses into the demonical abyss. The melancholic twofoldness that 
sustains the irreducible negativity of existence in its wholeness and at the 
same time the uniqueness of the self as a substantial rest unabridged by 
this negativity (the melancholic is less than nothing, and, like the modern 
Antigone, he has a unique pain, a thorn in the flesh) is thus somewhat 
reinvented by the ironist through his constant reference to the abstract 
intelligent interplay of contradictions and of self overtaking into 
nothingness from the narcissistic perspective towards both the world and 
language – otherwise that’s the melancholic disposition claimed by 
Kierkegaard until the very end: the melancholic condition of being alone 
within the world.  
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 We can now conclude our short exposé by a final articulation. In 
regards to offering an alternative identity to the idealistic and Hegelian 
one, Kierkegaard seems to oscillate between the conceptualization of irony 
as a presentation (an acting-out in psychoanalytical terms) and a re-
presentation of the fundamental negativity that fuels it6. The two positions 
are approximately covered on the one hand by the distinction between the 
Socratic irony and the modern one and on the other by the inner division of 
the irony sensu eminentiori – executive and contemplative, Here we can see 
the dimension of infinite absolute negativity where Kierkegaard meets 
Hegel and this is the closest his view gets to Hegel’s. S. Agacinski arguably 
suggests that Kierkegaard’s early Hegelianism becomes a whole new 
dialectics within the first one, given the fact that his Socrates becomes more 
negative than Hegel’s: If Hegel can be said to have perfectly understood 
Socrates' negativity (Kierkegaard borrows most of his analyses from him), he 
also wanted to find a "positive aspect" in Socrates that would have made him 
assimilable to the history of philosophy. This leads Hegel to "divide" Socrates 
and finally to relegate irony, or the "questioning attitude," to a secondary 
status by distinguishing it from its goal: the positing by subjectivity of the 
Idea as such. But this goal itself is not reached by Socrates. Since the Idea is 
"still" entirely abstract, it has no content whatsoever.7 The interplay that 
emerges between an inscription of the ironist in the brink of reflexivity and 
the lack of the symbolic that seems to always resist demonically directly to 
the religious negativity of Abraham – the one that defines the absolute 
relation to the absolute – bears thus the suspense of irony, an 
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the world, a condition for acquiring wholeness of personality or human plenitude.”, 
”Melancholy, Irony, and Kierkegaard” p. 68, International Journal  for Philosophy of 
Religion, Vol. 17, No. 1/2 (1985), pp. 67-85.   
7 S. Agacinski, op. cit., p. 34. 
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incommunicable proof of the exception of the melancholic.8 Finally, we can 
understand that irony’s ultimate key, while rewritten throughout all of 
Kierkegaard’s literary registers, is Boredom, […] the only continuity the 
ironist has. Boredom, this eternity devoid of content, this salvation devoid of 
joy, this superficial profundity, this hungry glut.  As it’s the duty of the 
existential thinker to keep the wound of negativity open, it’s also a fatal 
encounter with the nudity of existence that gapes the wound beforehand. 
Therefore, irony bears witness to the incommunicable truth of existence, 
the real lack of lack that the melancholic denounces and simultaneously 
affirms, in his suspension between the object cause of desire and an 
unfathomable and eminent object cause of nothing, nothing of the Other 
(Autre) of language.                
 
  
                                                          
8 An exception portrayed as melancholic in an eloquent paragraph of the Journal: Oh, the 
sadness of having understood something true and then of only seeing oneself misunderstood. 
Oh, sadness for what is irony in the mystery of the heart but sadness. Sadness means to be 
alone in having understood something true and as soon as one is in company with others, 
with those who misunderstand, that sadness becomes irony. Op. cit., p. 132. 
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ABSTRACT 
The Socratic truth is in no way inferior to the Christian one in 
Kierkegaard’s view. The fundamental difference between the two is that 
whereas the later develops by means of a donation and of a specific 
dialectic as such, the former is hidden within the negative and anti-
dialectical discourse of irony. We can therefore maintain that irony always 
pertains to the melancholic dimension of existence. My work aims to 
consider irony as a melancholic negativity, insofar as it is closely related to 
the demonic silence and void and as it rejects the wholeness of 
philosophical language. Sickness and health, symptom and remedy, the 
Kierkegaardian irony is melancholic because it perpetually suffers from its 
own re-opened wound, which allows us to interpret it from a 
psychoanalytical standpoint. Thus, the affinity between Kierkegaard and 
psychoanalysis sustains a Lacanian approach to the melancholic irony, in 
order to clarify its function in pinpointing the “real” truth of existence 
through a resistance to language.  
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